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Abstract
 
Our objective here is to establish the proposition that creative entrepreneurship gives rise 
to a market order which is optimally adjusted to facilitate the introduction and the diffusion of 
innovations, particularly those that take the form of new markets, new organizational schemes, 
new management devices and new methods and means of doing business. To substantiate this claim 
we extract from the existing historical literature and employ the ideal type entrepreneurial 
method of the Greek diaspora network. The interpretation we offer is that this method showed a 
high degree of operational flexibility and institutional adaptability and that it is these two proper-
ties that explain its marked tenacity over time. The key ingredient for its success is traced to the 
self-regulatory robustness of the network, which was secured by the commitment of its partners 
to a moral order based on the triptych of ‘trust, reliability and reciprocity’ as well as to their ac-
ceptance in advance of the sanctions in case of transgressions. Moreover, the embeddedness of 
the branches of the network in the Greek communities abroad, called Paroikies, where the Greek 
Orthodox Church provided moral leadership and maintained the community ties, reinforced the 
adherence of network partners to the rules of ethical business conduct. But in our view the domi-
nant force in the design of the core mechanism that made the Greek diaspora network such a suc-
cess was entrepreneurship.  
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1. Introduction 
Entrepreneurship performs many functions in the economy. One is, for example, the mobi-
lization, organization and management of human and material resources for the production and 
distribution of products and services in the most efficient way. This is carried out under various 
institutional setups and is known in the bibliography as intrapreneurship. Another is the discov-
ery of disequilibrium situations between supply and demand and the adoption of initiatives to ex-
ploit them for profit, with the result that the economy is steered along a growing path of flexible 
stability. Still another is the undertaking of business ventures which are accompanied by uninsur-
able risks and uncertainty; and last but not least, a fourth function, to be referred to below as 
creative entrepreneurship, is the introduction, diffusion, and imitation of innovations in the form 
of new products and services, new production techniques, new organizational schemes, and new 
management devices and methods.2  
All entrepreneurial functions are important. But creative entrepreneurship in the above 
sense is of topmost significance for at least four reasons. First, because it receives the signals that 
are transmitted from the economy in the form of incentives and determines what and how much 
knew knowledge will be produced; Second, because it transforms new knowledge into entrepre-
neurial opportunities, which in turn shape the conditions for the introduction and the diffusion of 
innovations throughout the economy; Third, because through the process of imitation it acts as a 
stabilizing mechanism for the economy by smoothening out the effects of creative destruction; 
and fourth, because through all the above channels it contributes dynamically to economic 
growth, and hence to the rising per capital incomes. Therefore, what is surprising is not that en-
trepreneurship in general and creative entrepreneurship in particular started to be recognized in 
recent years at the national and international levels as primary sources of economics progress, but 
that it was ignored for so many decades. 
Much of the credit for the revival of the interest in creative entrepreneurship is due to the 
scholarly efforts of the followers of Schumpeter (1934, 1942) who managed to bring his path-
breaking ideas into professional prominence and thus led to a heightened appreciation of how 
entrepreneurs responding to market signals determine with their actions the rate and the direction 
                                                 
2  The established distinction in the relevant literature is between passive and active entrepreneurship. Passive being, for example, 
the perception of profit opportunities due to disequilibrium situations, whereas the undertaking of initiatives to exploit them fall 
in the category of active entrepreneurship. Here by introducing the term creative we want to place the emphasis not on the na-
ture of the functions perform by entrepreneurship but on their dynamic effects. That is why we stress the element of “newness” 
in these activities.  
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of innovations. But in attaining this achievement Machlup (1962), Mansfield (1977), Scherer 
(1980) and a long list of other researchers in the same tradition, focused exclusively on the group 
of mature economies, where markets function more or less efficiently and the prevailing institu-
tions provide stimulating incentives for undertaking innovative activities. As a result, and under 
the growing influence of the writings by such prominent authors as Williamson (1985), North 
(1990), and Hodgson (1998), economists interested in the plight of underdeveloped countries 
started to realize that creative entrepreneurship could not flourish there, unless these countries 
acquired a favorable market order.  
 Thus economic growth theorists as well as development experts have come to suggest that 
these countries need appropriate institutional and social conditions. On the market side, for ex-
ample, their advice is to adopt freedom of exchange, lack of price controls, taxation with fairness 
and certainty, etc., whereas on the social side they consider as imperative to provide for private 
property rights, a legal framework comprising bankruptcy, contract and competition laws, an ef-
fective judicial system for resolving quickly and at low cost conflicts among citizens, etc. By im-
plication, if these countries are to look to creative entrepreneurship as a promising process to-
wards economic development, it is extremely useful to know how these conditions come about. 
For if they are established and sustained in a spontaneous, completely decentralized way, the 
policies that they ought to follow are different than those that would be required if these condi-
tions are generated through deliberate and conscious coordination efforts or have to be imposed 
by external sanction systems.   
Unfortunately the evidence on this fundamental question is highly ambivalent. Following 
the Weberian tradition, according to which markets can function more or less effectively only if 
they are embedded into an appropriate social structure, a group of researchers led by Platteau 
(1994) have argued that, if left to themselves, markets cannot work efficiently for two reasons. 
First, because they do not give rise to the institutions that are necessary to solve the problem of 
trust among economic agents, and second, because even if such institutions were created sponta-
neously, markets cannot be expected to lead to a social environment of so-called “generalized 
morality”, which is required to keep direct and indirect transactions costs low. So they have con-
cluded that in order to maintain social cohesiveness the market system must be supplemented 
with rules and enforcement mechanisms by a third party like the state. On the contrary, another 
group of researchers headed by Granovetter (1985) and Moore (1994) maintain that markets are 
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to a high degree self-regulating and that it is wrong to believe that there is need for externally 
imposed institutions to instill and sustain trust among economic agents or to bring about a state 
of generalized morality. For them it holds that through repeated interactions economic agents es-
tablish and maintain incentives for trustworthy behavior, including loyalty to moral norms for 
preserving their reputation within the framework of the groups they associate with. By implica-
tion, these researchers abhor all interventions to markets because, aside from not contributing to 
social cohesiveness and generalized morality, in their view, they raise transactions costs and 
thereby undermine the efficiency of markets.  
The arguments by the latter group of researchers in favor of the view that markets are self-
regulating gain considerable weight in the realm of international economy. To understand the 
reasons why, it suffices to call attention to the fact that the establishment of World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) is a relatively recent development in economic history and that even this entity 
may prove quite weak to impose and enforce appropriate rules for solving the problem of trust among 
nations, let alone among individual transactors located in different countries. Moreover, assuming 
that WTO manages over time to increase its credibility, the issues relating to moral norms, as cor-
roborated currently by the high rates of piracy of intellectual property particularly in China, are bound 
to remain beyond the domain of its authority. Still, despite these gaps international trade goes on at an 
increasing rate. Therefore, the establishment of appropriate institutions for stimulating creative entre-
preneurship internationally will depend in the foreseeable future more on the self-regulating proper-
ties of global markets and less on the presence and trustworthiness of whatever organizations are au-
thorized to enforce the provisions of international economic agreements.3  
Our objective in this paper is to establish the proposition that creative entrepreneurship per-
forms a fifth and equally important function. Namely, that it gives rise to a market order which is op-
timally adjusted to facilitate the introduction and the diffusion of innovations, particularly those that 
take the form of new markets, new organizational schemes, new management devices and new meth-
ods and means of doing business. To this effect in Section 2 we outline the ideal type entrepreneurial 
method of the Greek diaspora network and comment on its institutional features and services by 
drawing on the rich, albeit apospasmatic, literature on the Greek diaspora communities. Follow-
ing Pepelasis Minoglou (2005) the interpretation we offer is that this method showed a high degree 
                                                 
3  In this respect it is interesting to note that, according to Casson (1995), the way in which modern day multinational enterprises 
contribute to international economic growth is by building “trust” among trading nations.     
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of operational flexibility and institutional adaptability and that it is these two properties that explain 
its marked tenacity over time. But here we go much further in that we use the Greek Diaspora net-
work as a case study to highlight how historically individual agents in the process of exchange sup-
plemented the market in the creation of general rules and a moral order that enhanced creative entre-
preneurship in international business, at a time when supranational regulatory regimes were weak. 
From the presentation in Section 3 it turns out that the key mechanism of the network was its self-
regulatory robustness, which was secured by the commitment of network partners to a moral code 
based on the triptych of ‘trust, reliability and reciprocity’ as well as their acceptance in advance of the 
sanctions in case of transgressions. Then, in Section 4, we explain how the embeddedness of the net-
work into the Greek communities abroad, called Paroikies, provided the environment of “generalized 
morality” that Platteau (1994) and his followers stress as a necessary and sufficient condition for 
markets to be self-regulating. Our interpretation in this regard is that, even though the active 
presence in the Paroikies of Greek Orthodox Church reinforced the climate of generalized moral-
ity, the latter prevailed because of the entrepreneurial method of the Greek diaspora network.  
Finally, in the Section 5, we summarize our findings and conclusions. 
 
2. The ideal type entrepreneurial method of Greek diaspora   
The origins of the Greek diaspora date back to antiquity but for the modern era they can be 
traced to the beginnings of the rise of the world economy in the sixteenth century, if not earlier. 
This mercantile diaspora, which by the eighteenth century controlled the commerce of the Bal-
kans and the Levant, experienced its ‘golden age’ from circa 1780/1820 to the early 1900s/1912.4   
During this long period the Greek mercantile diaspora became internationally prominent in the 
long-distance maritime trade of staple goods and financial intermediation between the Black Sea-
Eastern Mediterranean and the West. In this ‘golden age’, flourishing tight knit Greek merchant 
communities ‘paroikies’ spread from Alexandria, Constantinople, Odessa, Smyrna, and Tagan-
rog, in the East, to Livorno, London, Marseilles, and Paris in Western Europe. The business op-
erations of Greek diaspora ‘merchant barons’ developed autonomously from the Greek economy. 
                                                 
4  The term ‘mercantile’ as used here, is vested with two meanings.  First, it denotes that Greek merchants combined simultane-
ously or serially trade with other activities. Second, it is meant to describe an entrepreneurial behaviour, which consisted ‘of 
adaptive responses to short-term opportunities for capital accumulation rather than creative [e.g. industrial] innovation and 
long-term planning’; hereby thus following the term mercantile as used in Turell and Van-Helten (1987). See also Pepelasis 
Minoglou and Ioannides (2004). 
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They were of a multinational scale, and, perhaps not surprisingly, attracted the attention of one of 
the early great economists. In particular, Jean Baptiste Say, in his Cours Complet D' Economie 
Politique Pratique (1828), devoted a special section to the merchants of only two nations: the Greeks 
and the Americans.  
  Throughout its golden age Greek diaspora merchants adopted a uniform entrepreneurial 
method, which was the outcome of a long process of evolution.5  The origins of this ideal type 
method can be found within the eighteenth century community of ‘itinerant’ merchants. The core 
features of this method were: a) the operational flexibility of the Greek Merchant House, which 
permitted the extraction of scale and network economies; b) the self-regulating and highly adapt-
able nature of mechanisms, which cultivated trust among participating parties and maintained 
norms of ethical business conduct; c) the internal diffusion of information, which made partners 
privy to exclusive ex ante opportunities for profit, d) the innovations introduced in the forms and 
instruments of trading, and e) the bonding of partners through ethnic, religious, language, family, 
and other ties so that all were expected to abide by certain rules of conduct and accept sanctions 
for transgressions from ethical business practices.  Below, we will show that features (a)-(c) are 
unique to the entrepreneurial method of Greek diaspora because, by giving it a highly flexible 
form, they enabled it to withstand the transformation of the nineteenth century mercantile dias-
pora into the twentieth century shipping diaspora.  
 
2.1. The ‘unique’ services of the Greek Diaspora network   
Greek diaspora entrepreneurs, even after the dawn of the second era of globalization circa 
the1920s did not develop a strong incentive to adopt the organizational framework of the hierar-
chical corporate firm, as was the general case in large scale operations in international business. 
This Greek diaspora originality and digression from the ‘stylized’ historical trajectory would not 
have been possible without the unique features of the Greek entrepreneurial method. To an 
analysis of these features we turn immediately below.  
 
2.1.1. The Greek diaspora Merchant House: a flexible network-shaped entity  
The nineteenth century multinational mercantile empires of the successful Greek diaspora 
                                                 
5  The term “uniform” meaning here that merchants conformed to this method regardless of the geographical locus where they 
were based.  
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entrepreneurs took the shape of agglomerations of a variety of organizations.6  At the center of 
each of these agglomerations stood a Merchant House. The latter would take the legal shape of a 
general or a limited partnership and throughout the growth of its domain, it would persist as its 
core organization.  Unlike Western Merchant Houses that were Trading Companies engaged in 
long distance trade, this Merchant House did not have the rigid structure of a firm. Instead, it was 
an amorphous fluid entity, involving a large number of actors and ad hoc renewable, often in-
formal, collaborations. Indeed, it may be argued that the Greek Merchant House resembled more 
a network than a firm on two grounds. First, because its international branches were in substance 
not branches, but separate entities, and, secondly, because as the House expanded it spread its 
tentacles not only by increasing its number of branches, but also through building a web of op-
portunistic collaborations with other Houses or Merchants, most of whom belonged either to 
other members of the same family or to the internationally dispersed network of Greek diaspora 
traders (Pepelasis Minoglou, 1998; 2005).  
External collaborations acted as a popular venue for diversification into banking, shipping, 
industry and other areas. Let it be noted that this diversification often involved also a geographi-
cal shift in the focus of activities of the House. Usually diversification was aggressive. In contrast 
to what was the usual case, it occurred before there was a fall in profits in the core sector of the 
House, i.e. the long distance trade in grain. As to their form, such collaborations involved a mix-
ture of informal ad hoc partnerships, often based on oral agreements, short-term joint ventures, 
with a specific objective such as the chartering of ships, or even sea loans; commenda type deals; 
the formation of limited partnerships or even Societe Anonymes Companies. These external col-
laborations would be undertaken either by the House as an entity or by individuals belonging to 
the House. For it was the custom for merchants and (for agents) to maintain a privateer status in 
parallel to their participation in a Merchant House.  
Finally, in contrast to Western Merchants and Trading Companies engaged in the long distance 
reciprocal trade between East and West, Greek Merchant Houses had the advantage of not relying on 
outside agents. Instead, they internalized transaction costs by establishing their own agents along the 
trade route: the local producing hinterland, depot centers, such as Livorno, and large western ports. 
The Greek Merchant House, by penetrating the market at both ends, was able to reduce the cost of 
                                                 
6  The meaning of the term “variety” is that these organizations contained the full range of set ups lying between informal oral 
agreements and formal firms, some of which were even fledged joint stock companies. 
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trade and attain efficiency gains.  
Moreover, the Greek Merchant House was able to adapt successfully to exogenous shocks and 
changes in trade routes. It was this fluidity that allowed Greek Houses in Holland with the closure of 
the Dutch ports between 1780-1782, to shift their operations to Trieste. Another such example of 
adaptability is the shift of the operations of the Odessa based Greek Merchant Houses to the Sea of 
Azov in the 1850s-70s, as a result of the relative decline of Odessa as a grain exporter.  
In a nutshell, the Merchant House of Greek diaspora constituted an institutional innovation in in-
ternational business because as a flexible organization it was successful in lowering transaction costs, 
attaining a long life and responding quickly to shifting market conditions. As a result of its operational 
flexibility and adaptability, a situation of path dependence developed, whereby Greek diaspora entre-
preneurs over the long duration maintained a preference for fluid business arrangements, which allowed 
them to engage simultaneously and serially in multiple loose partnerships.  
 
2.1.2. Endogenous generation of business opportunities 
 Unlike what was the general case with closed clubs, or the networks ‘of trust and reputa-
tion’ of other trading diasporas, this geographically and functionally dispersed peer group pro-
vided to individual member merchants an ex ante access to the participation in numerous profit 
opportunities in collaboration with other merchants belonging to this closed network. A key 
mechanism that guaranteed the smooth operation of this unique service was that the honesty of 
each member of the peer network of merchants was constantly being monitored through the reli-
ance of each merchant trader on ad infinitum renewable collaborations. This commercial mecha-
nism limited post-contractual opportunism among partners and agents most of whom were based 
in distant locations (Pepelasis Minoglou and Ioannides, 2004).  
Additionally the Greek diaspora network also offered the more conventional services, that 
closed groups and networks are supposed to provide to their members. Namely, it offered its 
members exclusive information services; it served as a pool for prospective ‘trustworthy’ busi-
ness collaborators; and it acted as an informal ‘insurance mechanism’ enhancing the ability of 
merchants to spread risk and handle uncertainty. 
 
2.1.3. Innovative forms and means of trading  
From a wide perspective the Greek diaspora entrepreneur was an Schumpeterian innovator 
in that he conceived and applied new practices (creative innovation) in the trade of goods and 
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financial intermediation between Western Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. Indicatively, 
we here refer to two examples. The first is the method of cargo trade and worked as follows: A 
Merchant House loading grain in Odessa or Taganrog dispatched a bill of lading and sample to 
the family House in London, which sold it in anticipation of arrival. Cash paid might then be 
used for purchase of coal, textiles or other return cargoes. Speculative profits were often made 
from this method of trading, as a cargo would be sold two or three months prior to arriving to its 
final destination. Also it was the case that the cargo of grain by the time it arrived to the West, 
might have been sold numerous times, so the final owner would not be the original buyer, but a 
third or fourth party. The second is the mandat method improvised by a small group of Greek di-
aspora bankers in Constantinople in the late 1860s. Through this method Greek bankers interna-
tionalized the domestic public debt of the Ottoman Empire and increased the flow of funds into 
the Ottoman state treasury.7
In sum, the innovative entrepreneurial method of the Greek mercantile diaspora was possi-
ble because of the existence of a dense high trust network, which provided a mixture of novel 
and traditional internal regulatory mechanisms. In such an environment free riding, rentier and 
moral hazard behavior among the members of the network were reduced or eliminated. Thus, 
their efforts were spent mostly to create profit opportunities (Schumpeterian type entrepreneur-
ship) rather than to exploit unnoticed ones (Kirznerian type entrepreneurship). 
 
2.2. The test of time as a proof of success of the ideal type Greek diaspora method 
The mercantile diaspora began to recede by the end of the first decade of the twentieth cen-
tury, as it suffered severe blows by the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, the dissolution of the Ot-
toman Empire and the rise of the local middle classes in Egypt, which limited the room for finan-
cial activities by Greeks and other foreigners. As Harlaftis (1996) has shown, from the ashes of 
this mercantile diaspora rose the shipping diaspora. It was the large Greek grain merchants for 
example in London (such as the Vaglianos) or in Odessa (such as the Rodocanachi) who became 
the first Greek shipowners and who made the transition from sail to steam.  
 Throughout the twentieth century, Greek diaspora shipowners controlled an increasing 
proportion of world tramp shipping, (i.e. shipping in bulk commodities in a free-loose manner 
and with no fixed and regular schedule. Let it be noted here that 2/3 of world shipping takes the 
                                                 
7 This innovation is described in Pepelasis Minoglou (2002). 
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form of tramp shipping) Diaspora entrepreneurship in its transition from trade to shipping has re-
mained firmly attached to the method that characterized the mercantile era. As in the past there is a 
strong degree of network embeddedness and multiple ad hoc collaborations among members.  There 
are also some indications that, as during the mercantile phase, the members of the diaspora shipping 
community were privy to ex ante exclusive profit opportunities.     
The diaspora shipping firms of the mid-late twentieth century did not assume a corporate char-
acter in spite of their large size. Throughout the second period of globalization, as entities they re-
sembled more networks than firms with well-defined boundaries and were in fact less hierarchical 
formations compared to their contemporaneous western counterparts in liner or bulk shipping.   
In the shipping diaspora, very much as was the case with the mercantile diaspora, each firm-
House was broken down into many units.  Segmentation was related to the fact that shipowners 
wished to have control over the everyday operations and the strategic management of their firms. 
When they feared loss of control or when it was restrained, they would dissolve their partnerships 
and go on their own. Usually an individual twentieth century Greek shipowner, as the diaspora mer-
chant in the nineteenth century, would be involved consecutively or even in parallel in collaborations 
with other members of his closed social group in a variety of business ventures in different combina-
tions. This reality is only now beginning to change and the Greek-owned shipping business is moving 
towards a more corporate form of organization.  
The tenacity of the nineteenth century mercantile diaspora entrepreneurial method and its 
‘adoption’ (or one may argue continuation) by the twentieth century Greek owned shipping 
community is all the more remarkable, if we take into consideration the supremacy of the latter in 
the international business community.  
 
2.3 Synopsis of findings so far    
Our reading of related historical evidence offers the interpretation that the ideal type entre-
preneurial method of Greek Diaspora, which has shown remarkable operational flexibility and 
institutional adaptability over time, is an example of an endogenous process of institutional in-
novation within itself. Indeed, the Greek mercantile diaspora provides fertile ground for specula-
tion regarding the question whether big business (and the growth of the firm) needs by necessity 
be identified with the managerial/corporate firm.  The Greek diaspora Merchant House and ship-
ping firms are a historical case which portrays how, when networks are efficient, a situation of 
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path dependence develops whereby in the transition from small to large organizations, the latter may 
take the shape of network based ‘amorphous’ business hybrids instead of hierarchies (Colli, 2003; 
Jones, 2005; Casson and Cox, 1998; Jones and Rose, 1993). In addition, our historical analysis 
showed how the Greek Diaspora network supplemented the market in the creation of general rules 
enhancing creative entrepreneurship in international business, at a time when supranational regula-
tory regimes were weak. Here also, given the tenacity of diaspora network, it may be argued that a 
mechanism of path dependence and endogenous formation of institutions was at work.   
 
3. Mechanisms of self-regulation 
The Greek diaspora extended geographically from the frontier economy of the Sea of 
Azov, to the weak and corrupt states of the Eastern Mediterranean, and the more developed na-
tion states of Western Europe. Clearly, since the network had international dimensions, by neces-
sity it adapted and operated in a multitude of institutional settings. So to fill the institutional vac-
uum that characterized the global economy at the time, the network had to develop as a self-
regulating mechanism of defining rules of business conduct and enforcing them on it members.  
In particular, although the members of the Greek mercantile diaspora engaged in business across 
borders, they operated as a closed community and transactions were carried out internally within 
the diaspora network according to well-defined moral order and well-enforced rules.   
  A rich literature exists on the religious, legal and educational foundations created within 
the Greek mercantile Paroikies.  However, these foundations have been examined up to now ba-
sically from a philanthropic perspective. Their role in enhancing creative entrepreneurship has not 
been noticed before. We would like to put forward the argument that in the absence of strong supra-
national regulatory institutions for the prevention and resolution of conflicts in the nineteenth century, 
the diaspora network adopted and enforced a moral code for business practices, which built and 
maintained successfully the trust between the geographically and functionally dispersed trading and 
business partners. 
 
3.1 The new moral order  
At the opening of the nineteenth century developments within the mercantile diaspora com-
munities situated in the Ottoman Empire instigated the creation of a new moral order. To explain, in 
1806 Sultan Selim granted commercial privileges to the ‘Greek nation’ which led to the creation of a 
self-regulating Greek Traders’ Coalition formally recognized by the Ottoman authorities and which 
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was based on a system of legal decrees, an amalgam of the 1807 Napoleonic Commercial Code and 
the body of Greek Customary Law that had evolved spontaneously since the Byzantine era.  
The Traders’ Coalition was not simply a legal entity. It played an important role in the 
dissemination of the new moral order throughout the international nexus of Greek diaspora mer-
chants. Specifically, the two formal chapters of the Greek Traders’ Coalition in Constantinople 
and Smyrna acted as inspirational blueprints for the ‘enlightenment’ of the Greek world of trad-
ers via the following twin procedure: the transplantation of modern (western) commercial tech-
niques and the strict adherence to Christian Orthodox virtues within the international Greek dias-
pora merchant paroikies as an entity. Namely, scientific and moral enlightenment were advo-
cated as a sine qua non for the material progress and success of the international Greek diaspora. 
A major testimony to the enlightening activities of the Traders’ Coalition is the notorious 
Commercial Encyclopedia Ermis o Kerdoos (1815-7) published in Venice with the initiative of the 
Greek Traders’ Coalition of Constantinople. Its author Nikolaos Papadopoulos provided detailed 
guidelines for success in business. Apart from his advice on many practical issues –such as for ex-
ample the ‘proper’ way to issue bills of exchange; the introduction of limited liability partnerships; 
and the need for the application of the system of double entry book keeping- he gave a central posi-
tion to the obedience in the ‘commandments’ of the Christian Orthodox faith and diligence. More-
over, merchants were advised to adopt the following virtues: humbleness; frugality; respect of eld-
ers; fair treatment of other merchants; promptness in payments and obligations; and the support of 
the education and training of young aspiring merchants (Ermis o Kerdoos, written by Nikolaos Pa-
padopoulos, Volume One, Ermathini, Commercial Study, Venice, 1815, 139-165).8  
Other testimonies of the enlightening impact of the Traders’ Coalition and its commitment to 
the spread of a new moral order is the publication of numerous books informative on the western 
ways of doing commerce and the founding of commercial schools as for example that in 1817 in 
                                                 
8  From historical evidence we know that in order to become a member of the network a merchant had to abide by 
several requirements That a merchant trader ought to be of Greek descent and belong to a family of merchant trad-
ers were desired conditions, but not sufficient. The only absolutely indispensable requirement was that a merchant 
ought to have a reputation of being honest. Moreover, there were unwritten rules of correct moral and commercial 
conduct which member merchants had to ‘abide to’: They had to be loyal and display reciprocity and deep solidar-
ity to other members of the network. They were expected to be obedient towards their elders, have the ability to 
keep commercial secrets, work diligently, be thrifty, have capital liquidity, be creditworthy and complete their ob-
ligations towards other parties on time. Hence, the recommendations made in Ermis o Kerdoos had been adopted 
and put into actual practice. 
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Odessa.. In sum, within the Greek mercantile diaspora there were two cultural influences at play: the 
reality of the so-called ‘Levantine’ unreliable and parochial business practices versus the vision of 
modernity. The latter, a combination of new western business techniques, the ethos of the enlighten-
ment, and eastern (orthodox) Christian values, prescribed a new moral order, which it may be argued 
was a cornerstone for the success of Greek diaspora networks.   
  
3.2 Enforcement 
A threat of sanctions was required for the preservation of the moral community within the 
Greek diaspora merchant network. Members who practised fraud (Mandylara, 1998) or who 
adopted unconventional business practices would be ostracized. Two notorious examples in the 
second category were Adamantios Korais who as a young aspiring merchant lived in Amsterdam 
in the 1770s, and Stephanos Xenos, whose business operations were based in mid-nineteenth-
century London. In both cases, some hints that they committed fraud resulted to their expulsion. 
However, the insinuation of fraud on their part was more of an excuse, as the real crime commit-
ted was that they did not conform to the norm. Korais adopted western techniques faster than the 
rest of the diaspora community in Amsterdam. To some extent this was also true of Xenos who, 
when nearing default, was not bailed out by his fellow Greek merchants because socially he was 
considered an outsider.  
Expulsion was not always clear-cut. This was especially so if the ‘errant’ merchant had 
powerful personal or family connections within the Diaspora merchant community. For example, 
when Korais withdrew from his merchant activities maintained close social relations with 
Amvrosios Rallis and other important merchants. Another example is that of Ioannis Avgerinos 
in Smyrna, who was apparently guilty for fraud. He used his clout to hide his fraud and was de 
facto expelled only when he went bankrupt. Also the Diaspora community was not sealed from 
outside influences, as richer merchants originating from Ottoman provinces often sought the dip-
lomatic protection of western ‘business’ nations.9    
 
4. The embeddedness of the network in the Greek diaspora communities 
Under Ottoman rule, the Greek nation had organized itself within the framework of semi-
autonomous and self-regulating communities. The diaspora Paroikies evolved in part from custom-
                                                 
9 For example, the notorious diaspora merchant Andreas Syngros enjoyed the diplomatic protection of Holland. 
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ary law and traditions, which cultivated among its members the principles of democratic represen-
tation and mutual assistance. Although there was uniformity in this aspect, it must be underlined 
that the Paroikies took diverse shapes. Initially some were compagnias (narrowly defined guild-
like communes) such as for example the 18th century Greek commercial compagnia of Brasov in 
Transylvania.10 Other diaspora paroikies, as for instance that of Saint George founded in Vienna in 
the 1720s, functioned as an ethnic co-fraternity, which represented its members in disputes with the 
local authorities. By the opening of the 19th century some others evolved into fully-fledged semi-
autonomous communities. Namely, though self-regulating nazione, they were well integrated in the 
cosmopolitan life of eminent port cities as Alexandria, Livorno and Marseilles. 
 Elected local Greek laymen, mostly leading merchants in collaboration with Christian or-
thodox Greek clergy, ruled Diaspora paroikies. It seems that in most cases, over time there was a 
shift in the balance of power:  the clout of the clergy in community affairs weakened, whereas 
the strength of merchants appears to have increased.  The economic, social and religious spheres 
were however throughout intimately intertwined as the members of these communities lived, 
worked and attended mass in the Greek ‘quarters’ which almost always lay at the commercial 
heart of their host cities. 
Interlocking merchant networks lay at the core of diaspora paroikies. Their leadership en-
forced the new moral order that was seminal for the perpetuation cum success of diaspora mer-
chant networks both of which were dependent on the triptych of ‘trust, reliability and reciproc-
ity’. While the triptych held a seminal position within the new moral order, the latter evolved 
over time in substance and manifestations as paroikies changed.  
In the early paroikies of 18th century Central Europe the moral order was close to the cus-
tomary law/traditions that had evolved within the Greek nation over the centuries. It was mani-
fested through the statutory rights of the leaders of the compagnias to undertake the arbitration 
and settlement of economic disputes among its members. The judges in such cases were practic-
ing merchants. In fact because they were in business themselves and they received no payment 
for their legal community services they reached fast decisions and this gave diaspora Greeks a 
competitive advantage, as otherwise they would have to succumb to the usually more lengthy 
legal procedures of the regular courts in their host countries.   
 
                                                 
10 There was diversity within each category of Greek diaspora paroikies as for example among the various compagnias.  
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5.  Concluding remarks 
According to the relevant literature, creative entrepreneurship in the sense that we defined 
it performs four very important functions in the economy. It determines which and how much 
new knowledge will be produced.  It shapes the conditions for the introduction and diffusion of 
innovations in the form of new products and services. It stimulates the process of imitation; and 
lastly it contributes dynamically to economic growth, and hence to the rising per capital incomes. In 
addition to these functions in this paper we established that creative entrepreneurship gives rise to 
institutions that are optimally adjusted to withstand the tribulations of revolutionary changes across 
centuries, countries, and ways and means of conducting business. By adopting a historically in-
formed theoretical approach (or one might argue vice versa) we showed how in the case of Greek 
diaspora network flexibility and adaptability became the foundations of a successful business 
method, which rendered the horizontally structured business organizations of the diaspora very 
efficient relative to hierarchical multinational firms.  
Our interpretation of the historical evidence led us to the conclusion that the tenacity over 
the last two centuries of the method and organizational forms of the Greek diaspora network can 
be attributed to the existence of a robust self-regulating mechanism, which was based on the 
principles of the moral order that were expounded by Nikolaos Papadopoulos in his publication 
Ermis o Kerdoos in Venice in 1815. By adopting these principles in their business conduct and 
by accepting in advance the sanctions for possible transgressions, the partners in the Greek dias-
pora network enjoyed all the benefits emanating from the triptych  ‘trust, reliability and reciproc-
ity’. Moreover, those who abided by these principles had the blessing of the leaderships of the par-
oikies in which they lived. As a result they operated in an environment of “generalized morality” in 
which ethical business practices benefited the merchants themselves and their communities. 
Finally, a remark regarding the challenge expressed by Moore (1994) for more empirical 
evidence on the processes by which reputational mechanisms are built and enforced endoge-
nously in various markets. The case that we presented demonstrated how entrepreneurship, in the 
absence of regulatory supranational institutions, led to the formation of a self–regulating Greek 
diaspora network that withstood the tribulations of international economic and political upheav-
als for over two centuries. Our interpretation of the historical evidence is that its time tenacity 
and success emanated from the fact that it acted as enforcement mechanism of a moral order that 
resolved effectively the problems of information in business transactions.   
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